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 EFFECTS OF ACQUISITIONS ON R&D INPUTS
 AND OUTPUTS
 MICHAEL A. HITT
 ROBERT E. HOSKISSON
 Texas A&M University
 R. DUANE IRELAND
 Baylor University
 JEFFREY S. HARRISON
 Clemson University
 Making acquisitions, although a popular strategy, may not always lead
 to positive firm performance. Researchers have offered several expla-
 nations for this relationship. One is that acquisitions lead to lower
 investments in R&D and curtail the championing process whereby or-
 ganization members internally promote new products and processes in
 firms. The current research found that acquisitions had negative effects
 on "R&D intensity" and "patent intensity."
 Making acquisitions has been a popular strategy in U.S. firms for many
 years (Leontiades, 1986). The resources invested in acquisitions-growing
 from $43.6 billion in 1968 to $246.9 billion in 1988 (Weston & Chung,
 1990)-reflect this popularity. Furthermore, the almost $250 billion in-
 vested in acquisitions accounted for approximately 40 percent of U.S. cor-
 porations' 1988 capital expenditures (Weiner, 1989). These data suggest ex-
 ecutives believe that acquisitions create value.
 However, the outcomes of acquisitions may not fully support this belief
 (Roll, 1986). Some evidence suggests that shareholders in acquired firms
 derive significant value from acquisitions (Jensen, 1988), but results regard-
 ing the value of acquisitions for the shareholders of acquiring firms have
 been decidedly mixed (Amihud, Dodd, & Weinstein, 1986; Fowler &
 Schmidt, 1988; Lubatkin, 1987; Lubatkin & O'Neil, 1987). Some researchers
 have found evidence of benefits for acquiring shareholders only in specific
 types of acquisitions: Hopkins (1987) found such evidence where there was
 "strategic fit," or similar strategic characteristics between acquiring and tar-
 get firms; Singh and Montgomery (1987) found it for related acquisitions.
 The authors are grateful for financial support from the Decision, Risk, and Management
 Science Program of the National Science Foundation and the Advanced Research Program,
 State of Texas, and for the comments, suggestions, and ideas from colleagues Robert Albanese,
 Stephen Cantrell, Don Hellriegel, Tammy Hunt, Dan Jennings, and Peter Luan. We also bene-
 fited from conversations with Jay Barney, Barry Baysinger, Albert Cannella, and Tom Turk.
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 Porter (1987) reported that acquisitions often did not yield anticipated out-
 comes and eventually led to divestitures. Additionally, Ravenscraft and
 Scherer (1987) conservatively estimated that acquirers had divested one-
 third of all acquisitions made in the 1960s and 1970s by the early 1980s.
 Both Porter and Ravenscraft and Scherer also suggested that the divestitures
 have largely been the result of inadequate performance. Roll (1986) con-
 cluded that acquirers may have overestimated the expected gains from ac-
 quisitions. Finally, Jensen (1988) observed that returns from acquisitions to
 acquiring firms vary closely around zero.
 Several rationales may explain these less-than-desired outcomes. For
 example, Barney (1988) argued that without the rare presence of a unique
 and private synergy1 between an acquiring and a target firm, the acquiring
 firm will bid the target's price to an amount equal to or beyond its value. Roll
 (1986) ascribed the latter situation to the hubris of managers bent on making
 specific acquisitions. As a result of acquiring firms' paying such premiums,
 their shareholders often gain no value, or even lose value from an acquisi-
 tion.
 A second rationale concerns the significant investments acquisitions
 require. Because of those expenditures, executives may trade investments in
 acquisitions for investments in other areas, such as advertising, R&D, and
 quality control. Franko (1989) showed that R&D investments are positively
 related to long-term performance, a finding suggesting that such a trade-off
 may have significant consequences. A third rationale for the poor outcomes
 of acquisitions is that they may intervene in the R&D process by affecting the
 "championing culture," a pattern of organizational activity that fosters in-
 novation (Burgelman, 1986). Acquisitions would thereby lower managers'
 incentives for first developing new product and process ideas and then
 carrying them to fruition. Thus, acquisitions may reduce both investment in
 R&D and R&D outputs, reductions that in turn can have a negative effect on
 a firm's long-term performance. In total, the logic and research results cited
 suggest that the link between acquisitions and improving an acquiring firm's
 performance may be more tenuous than some executives believe.
 To date, little research has examined these general issues and the more
 specific question of acquisitions' effects on R&D inputs and outputs. The
 National Science Foundation commissioned Charles River Associates to re-
 view and evaluate all data regarding acquisitions' effects on R&D. In its final
 report, Charles River Associates concluded that "[the] available data do not
 permit rigorous testing of hypotheses concerning the effects of mergers and
 acquisitions on private R&D activity" (1987: 51). The primary purpose of the
 present study was to examine one aspect of the relationship between acqui-
 sitions and performance-the effects of acquisitions on R&D inputs and
 outputs.
 1 Private synergy refers to synergy between acquiring and target firms that is due to unique
 resource complementarity not found among other potential bidders for a specific target.
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 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
 Acquisitions and R&D Inputs
 Burgelman (1986) argued that firms grow and develop through acquisi-
 tions or innovations. Generally, however, resource constraints dictate an
 emphasis on one or the other mode of growth. As noted previously, U.S.
 firms are investing significant amounts of resources in acquisitions. As is the
 case with virtually every organizational action, a commitment of resources
 to acquisitions may produce unintended consequences. For example, re-
 gardless of how acquisitions are financed, the resources remaining for man-
 agerial allocation may become constrained, causing managers to forgo other
 investment opportunities. One opportunity that may be slighted is R&D.
 In light of this logic, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (1990) argued that
 firms may substitute acquisitions for innovation. In such cases, managers
 will likely decrease investments in R&D. Acquisitions offer immediate en-
 trance to a new market, a larger share of a market served currently, or both
 (Balakrishman, 1988; Shelton, 1988). They may therefore be an attractive-
 although possibly a short-term-oriented-alternative to R&D investments.
 Although risks exist, the outcomes of acquisition are more predictable than
 the outcomes of internal development.
 In summary, the evidence suggests that making acquisitions, although a
 popular strategy, may not produce the positive returns executives and share-
 holders desire. A managerial decision to substitute investments in acquisi-
 tions for investments in R&D may contribute to that outcome. This possi-
 bility, coupled with the evidence presented herein, suggests the following:
 Hypothesis 1: A negative relationship exists between a
 firm's acquisitions and its relative R&D intensity, mea-
 sured as R&D investment divided by sales and adjusted
 for average industry R&D intensity.
 Acquisitions and R&D Outputs
 Acquisitions may also affect R&D outputs. Hitt and colleagues (1990)
 proposed that acquisitions have a negative effect on managerial commitment
 to innovation, defined as managerial willingness to allocate resources and
 champion activities that lead to the development of new products, technol-
 ogies, and processes consistent with marketplace opportunities. Regardless
 of their level, R&D resources must be managed effectively. Furthermore,
 new product and process ideas must be championed if they are to develop
 into patentable products or processes (Burgelman & Maidique, 1988). Pat-
 ents reflect a firm's intention to commercialize a product idea. An acquisi-
 tion may intervene in the championing process and reduce managerial com-
 mitment to innovation. If top-level managers have a low commitment to
 innovation, they will provide few rewards and incentives for creating and
 championing innovations. Thus, lower-level managers will be less likely to
 champion new product and process ideas that lead to patentable outcomes
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 than they would in an organization committed to innovation. As a result,
 transformations of ideation into marketable products become less likely:
 Hypothesis 2: A negative relationship exists between a
 firm's acquisitions and patent intensity, measured as its
 number of patents divided by sales.
 METHODS
 Firms and Data
 Acquired companies were identified through Standard and Poor's
 COMPUSTAT research files and studied if they had reported R&D expendi-
 tures in at least one of the three years prior to their acquisition. We then
 matched these companies to their acquirers using Moody's Industrial Man-
 ual and the Large Merger Series, a publication of the Federal Trade Com-
 mission. We used the primary, supplementary, tertiary, and over-the-
 counter research files distributed by COMPUSTAT Services to obtain data
 on R&D expenditures.
 Patent data were collected from two data bases, BRS Information Tech-
 nologies PATDATA and CASSIS/CDROM, both of which are based on infor-
 mation provided by the Patent and Trademark Office of the U.S. Department
 of Commerce. We used two data bases to ensure the data's accuracy, cur-
 rency, and effective aggregation to a firm level.
 Data on R&D expenditures and patents were required for both the ac-
 quiring and the acquired firms in the preacquisition periods and for the
 acquiring firms in the post-acquisition periods. Of the 278 acquisitions iden-
 tified, approximately one-third had inadequate data, resulting in a final
 group of 191 acquisitions completed from 1970 through 1986. The firms
 studied represent 29 industries; a list of the distribution of acquiring and
 target firms by industry is available from the authors.
 Data were collected on the acquiring and target firms for up to three
 years prior to the acquisitions and for three years after the years in which the
 acquisitions were completed. Because of differences in the way companies
 report financial information during transition, data from the years of acqui-
 sition were excluded. The number of acquisitions included in each statisti-
 cal test varied depending on data requirements and availability (see Table 2
 for the degrees of freedom associated with each analysis).
 Independent and Dependent Variables
 Figures from financial statements for the acquiring and acquired firms
 were combined in the preacquisition periods. Using these combined state-
 ments, we measured firm R&D intensity, defined as total R&D expenditures
 divided by total sales. As expected, there was a strong positive relationship
 between firm R&D intensity and industry R&D intensity. Thus, we controlled
 industry influences by subtracting average industry R&D intensity from the
 combined R&D intensity of each acquiring and acquired firm. The referent
 industries were the dominant industries of each firm defined using the
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 two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system; however, we also
 conducted secondary tests using three-digit industry data (Baysinger &
 Hoskisson, 1989; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Because acquiring and acquired firms
 often are involved in different dominant industries, industry R&D intensity
 was defined as the weighted average of the two industries. To maintain
 comparability with the preacquisition periods, we used sales figures for the
 last years before acquisitions as industry weights for all the post-acquisition
 years. Studied firms were not used in calculating their industry averages.
 Acquisitive growth (acquisitions) was measured using a dummy vari-
 able, with annual firm data in the before-acquisition period set equal to zero
 and data in the after-acquisition period set equal to one. This procedure is
 similar to Hoskisson's (1987) approach to measuring the longitudinal effects
 of M-form structural change.
 It is difficult to construct meaningful measures of innovative output
 (Pakes, 1985). Several researchers (e.g., Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Pakes &
 Griliches, 1980) have used the number of patents a firm holds as a measure
 of inventive activity. Of course, not all R&D activity leads to patents, and
 not all innovations are patented. Nonetheless, patent count is one of the most
 direct measures of innovative output available (Pakes & Griliches, 1980). In
 our data set, there was a strong relationship between total number of patents
 and firm size. Thus, we measured patent intensity by dividing the total
 number of patents a firm held by its annual sales.
 Control Variables
 A number of other variables potentially related to acquisitions may also
 affect R&D (Charles River Associates, 1987). Primary among these variables
 are diversification, leverage, size, liquidity, and performance. Acquisitions
 are a primary means of diversification that may be undertaken to reduce a
 firm's overall risk and consequently, its CEO's employment risk (Amihud &
 Lev, 1981; Harrison, 1987; Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1988). Although there is
 also evidence to the contrary (Kamien & Schwartz, 1982), some research has
 suggested a negative relationship between diversification and R&D inten-
 sity (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). We calculated
 the level of acquisition-firm diversification using the entropy measure
 (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985). This
 diversification measure has two components-related and unrelated diver-
 sification-with each component defined as:
 lP1 ln(1/Pi), i = 1,
 where P1 is the share of segment i in firm sales and (1/Pi) is the weight for
 each segment (the logarithm of the inverse of its share). This measure takes
 into account the number of segments in which a firm competes and the
 importance of each segment to its total revenues. Related diversification is
 defined as the diversification arising from operating in four-digit segments
 within a two-digit industry group, with industry group sales defined as the
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 sales reference, as in the formula above. Unrelated diversification is defined
 as diversification arising from operating between two-digit industry groups,
 with total firm sales used as the sales reference. Total diversification is the
 sum of the related and unrelated components; we used Standard and Poor's
 COMPUSTAT business segment file to calculate those components. Because
 these data are only available for years after 1979 and not available for all
 firms, the number of observations for the entropy measure was reduced by
 almost two-thirds.
 As a result of the significant reduction in data for total diversification
 measured by the entropy formula, we added a second measure of diversifi-
 cation, labeled diversifying acquisitions. This variable was a dummy with
 related acquisitions (those in the same two-digit industry as an acquirer's
 primary industry) set equal to zero and unrelated acquisitions (those in a
 different two-digit industry) set equal to one in the post-acquisition periods.
 This variable had a value of zero during the preacquisition periods. Data on
 this variable, diversifying acquisitions, were available for all firms.
 Financial theorists have encouraged the use of leverage since the pio-
 neering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), but its use involves trade-offs
 for firms. Smith and Warner (1979) argued that as firms increase their levels
 of debt, managers tend to become increasingly risk-averse. Baysinger and
 Hoskisson's (1989) finding of a negative relationship between amount of
 long-term debt and investment in R&D supports this argument. In the
 present study, we defined leverage as long-term debt divided by equity.
 Schumpeter (1961) hypothesized that large firms are more innovative
 than small firms because large firms have sustained and efficient R&D
 programs. Presenting contrary evidence, Kamien and Schwartz (1982) sug-
 gested that the relationship between firm size and innovation is a nonlinear,
 inverse-U relationship. Regardless of the shape of the relationship between
 firm size and R&D, it has been shown to be reasonably strong (Hitt et al.,
 1990). We defined size as a firm's total number of employees.
 Liquidity influences R&D investments by limiting the discretionary
 resources a firm can expend in a given period without incurring additional
 debt. Additionally, profitability affects decision makers' optimism and the
 funds available for R&D. Previous research has found a relationship be-
 tween degree of liquidity and levels of profitability and R&D (Elliott, 1971;
 Grabowski, 1968). We used the current ratio (current assets divided by cur-
 rent liabilities) to control for liquidity influences (Baysinger & Hoskisson,
 1989). Profitability was defined as after-tax return on total assets, or ROA,
 which was measured as net income divided by total assets.
 Data on industries' patent intensity were not available. Therefore, to
 control for potential industry influences on patents, we used industry R&D
 intensity as a control variable in the models with patent intensity as the
 dependent variable.
 Finally, to control for within-acquisition variance across the firms stud-
 ied as well as interdependence (autocorrelation) across time, we took a very
 conservative approach, creating a categorical variable for each acquisition to
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 control for these possible intervening influences. This is a common ap-
 proach in repeated-measures designs (Winer, 1974), and it has been used in
 both psychological (e.g., Hitt & Barr, 1989) and strategy (e.g., Hoskisson,
 1987) research. Our method essentially produced a pooled cross-sectional
 time series; we had separate entries for each firm for each year up to a
 maximum of six.
 RESULTS
 Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for
 all variables. Table 2 shows results of the regression models used to test the
 hypotheses.
 The results presented in the first regression model (model 1, Table 2)
 show that after size, leverage, ROA, and liquidity are controlled, the acqui-
 sitions variable is a statistically significant, negative predictor of R&D inten-
 sity adjusted for industry. Because of the 60 percent loss of data for the
 entropy measure of diversification, we entered it into a separate model con-
 taining all the other control variables to control for total diversification of the
 acquiring firms. The result, model 2, is quite similar to model 1. Acquisitions
 remain a negative predictor of adjusted R&D intensity (t = 7.07, p < .01);
 ROA and size were the only other statistically significant independent vari-
 ables. Total diversification was not a statistically significant predictor of
 adjusted R&D intensity (t = 1.58, n.s.). Therefore, these results provide
 strong support for Hypothesis 1.2
 Table 2 also shows the results of the testing of Hypothesis 2, in which
 patent intensity was the dependent variable. The results are similar to those
 for R&D intensity. Both acquisitions and ROA were found to have statisti-
 cally significant, negative effects on patent intensity (model 4). As with the
 R&D intensity models, we developed a second model including total firm
 diversification (the entropy measure with significantly reduced data). In this
 model (model 5), total firm diversification was the only statistically signif-
 icant independent variable (p < .01), and its relationship with patent inten-
 sity was negative. Approximately two-thirds of the acquisitions made were
 outside of the acquiring firms' primary two-digit SIC codes (see Table 1). As
 a result, we examined the effects of diversifying acquisitions on patent in-
 tensity (model 6). The results show diversifying acquisitions to have a sta-
 tistically significant negative effect (p < .01) on patent intensity. Thus, we
 may conclude that acquisitions negatively affect patent intensity primarily
 to the extent that they increase diversification. The results suggest that the
 2 A hierarchical regression model was developed with acquisitions as the last variable,
 entered after all control variables, for both the R&D intensity and patent intensity models. The
 changes in R' (.013 for R&D intensity and .014 for patent intensity) for both models were
 statistically significant at p < .01. Most of the control variables were statistically significant
 predictors in the restricted models without the acquisitions variable. Therefore, it is not sur-
 prising that the change in R' for the addition of the acquisitions variable in each model,
 although statistically significant, is not large.
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 TABLE 1
 Intercorrelations for All Variablesa
 Variables Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 1. Adjusted R&D
 intensity - 0.006 0.027
 2. Patent intensity 0.023 0.034 .221**
 3. Acquisitions 0.483 0.500 - .086** - .130**
 4. Sizeb 42,369 55,453 .053 -.080* .054
 5. ROA 0.065 0.040 .084** .051 -.087** .061*
 6. Leverage 0.434 0.562 - .028 - .069* - .048 - .056 - .307**
 7. Liquidity 2.167 0.661 .027 .237** -.152** -.352** .123** -.092
 8. Diversifying
 acquisitions 0.300 0.458 .003 -.028 .677** .038 -.008 .006 -.142**
 9. Total diversification 1.628 0.502 -.219** .113* .034 .161** -.017 .176** -.211** .204**
 10. Average industry
 R&D intensity 0.036 0.027 - .554** - .015 .160** .071* .017 - .160** .099** - .010 - .084
 a N = 1,021 except for patent intensity (N = 852) and total diversification (N = 386).
 b Size was measured as number of employees.
 * p < .05 **p < .01
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 TABLE 2
 Results of Regression Analysisa
 R&D Intensity Patent Intensity
 Independent Model Model Model Model Model Model
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
 Intercept *434** .865** .413** -.613* -.780** -.705*
 Acquisitions - .134** -.241** - .185** .018
 Total diversification .117 -.148**
 Diversifying
 acquisitions - .108** -.162**
 Size .092 .351* -.004 -.014 -.086 - .090
 Leverage -.019 -.006 -.022 -.003 .002 -.014
 ROA -.061** -.128** -.043* -.148** .028 - .133**
 Liquidity -.004 .032 .023 .070 -.054* .099*
 Average industry
 R&D intensity -.059 -.086* -.167*
 F 30.52** 20.62** 28.82** 9.60** 19.52** 9.45**
 R 2 .878 .903 .872 .731 .907 .728
 df 195,825 120,265 195,825 189,666 118,236 189,666
 a Variables controlling for autocorrelation and firm effects are not shown because of their
 number. As a whole they had a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable in each
 model.
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
 relationship between acquisitions and patents is more complex than pre-
 dicted in Hypothesis 2.
 DISCUSSION
 The results provide strong support for the negative effects of acquisi-
 tions on R&D investments and of diversifying acquisitions on R&D out-
 puts, or patents. These results are quite important because previous research
 (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988) concluded that
 firm diversification has negative effects on investments in R&D. However,
 the present results suggest that mode of entry-here, acquisition-may have
 a stronger effect on R&D investments than diversification. Additionally, the
 interaction of mode and type of entry (diversifying acquisitions) has impor-
 tant effects on R&D outputs. Thus, acquisitive growth strategies may have
 a negative effect on firm innovation (Hitt et al., 1990). In fact, managers may
 use acquisitions as a substitute for innovation. Managers can acquire tech-
 nology or products that are new to their firms but not necessarily new to the
 market (Clarke, Ford, & Saren, 1989). However, the reduction in relative
 R&D expenditures and resulting outputs following acquisitions suggests
 that over time, the innovativeness of acquired firms may decline. For in-
 stance, target firms may not pursue patents because of a loss of innovation
 champions. This loss may occur because target firms experience high turn-
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 over (Walsh, 1988, 1989). Furthermore, the reduction in relative numbers of
 patents following acquisitions suggests that acquiring firms are not fully
 exploiting acquired technologies or that they are not acquiring young tech-
 nologies.
 Franko's (1989) findings highlight the potential significance of these
 results. Franko examined global competition through changes in the shares
 of world markets (American, European, and Asian) held by leading firms in
 15 major industries for the 1960-86 period. He found the amount of re-
 sources allocated to R&D to be the primary predictor of subsequent sales
 growth performance relative to competition. Firms with lower R&D invest-
 ments than their competitors lost global market share. These findings, cou-
 pled with the results of this study, suggest that executives following an
 acquisitive growth strategy may be making trade-offs with significant impli-
 cations.
 Interestingly, Pakes (1985) found a strong positive relationship between
 stock market returns and unexpected (not predictable from historical trends)
 changes in patent applications. Given the frequency of the market's negative
 reaction to diversifying acquisitions (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988) and the nega-
 tive relationship between diversifying acquisitions and patent intensity
 found in this study, Pakes's results are not surprising. The market may react
 negatively to diversifying acquisitions as well as to sudden reductions in
 patent applications that diversifying acquisitions could precipitate. In com-
 bination, these results suggest that diversifying acquisitions may have neg-
 ative effects on a firm's long-term performance.
 One explanation often given for the reduction in R&D expenditures
 following acquisitions is that firms achieve a synergy based on economies of
 scale, scope, or both. According to the logic of Schumpeter (1961), R&D
 intensity should decrease following an acquisition because firms gain econ-
 omies of scale from the integration of R&D units. This logic suggests that
 acquisitions should have either no effect or a positive effect (because of
 potential R&D synergy) on R&D outputs. Also, there should be little rela-
 tionship or a negative relationship between R&D investments and the num-
 ber of patents achieved, at least for some time after acquisitions. However, a
 statistically significant, positive relationship between R&D intensity and
 patent intensity emerged in this study, a finding that previous research sup-
 ports (Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Jaffe, 1986; Schmookler, 1966). Additionally,
 the negative relationship between acquisitions and patents suggests that
 neither more nor even the same relative level of R&D outputs is achieved.
 Therefore, the results of this study do not support the existence of synergistic
 gains from economies of scale or scope in R&D activities from acquisitions
 and, in fact, suggest the opposite. Although absolute R&D inputs increased
 slightly after acquisitions, they decreased relative to competitors' R&D in-
 puts, and the absolute number of patents and number of patents adjusted for
 size decreased after acquisitions. Furthermore, the average annual change in
 patents before acquisitions was positive (+ 1.69), but the average annual
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 change after acquisitions was negative (- 1.88). These results support the
 argument that innovative outputs decline after acquisitions (Hitt et al.,
 1990).
 The present results primarily reflect outcomes that are being achieved,
 not the reasons for their achievement. However, Hitt and colleagues (1990)
 argued that managers engaging in acquisitions become more risk-averse than
 they have been and thus less committed to innovation. The statistical mod-
 els reported herein offer some evidence in support of that argument. In most
 of the regression models, ROA, used as a control variable, had a negative
 relationship with R&D inputs and outputs. On the surface this finding might
 seem curious, but it supports both prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
 1979) and our arguments. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) found that when
 firms perform well, they take fewer risks. Our results, showing a negative
 relationship between ROA and R&D activities in terms of inputs and out-
 puts, suggest that managers indeed take a more risk-averse stance as their
 firms' performance increases.
 Although acquisitions may have independent effects on R&D inputs and
 outputs, their real effects may be broader. For example, Hitt and colleagues
 (1990) argued that acquisitions are a primary mode of diversification and are
 often financed by debt. Previous research has shown that diversification
 (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988) and leverage
 (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989) have negative effects on R&D intensity. There-
 fore, to the extent that an acquisition strategy increases diversification and
 leverage, it also affects R&D inputs and outputs. Thus, our results may un-
 derstate the full effect of acquisitions on R&D inputs and outputs.
 CONCLUSIONS
 We have offered a number of potential explanations for the results re-
 ported herein. However, future research is required not only to confirm the
 findings of this study but also to test and extend theoretical rationales for the
 reported outcomes.
 Acquisitions also likely benefit firms. For example, a target firm's stock-
 holders often gain significant value from an acquisition. Furthermore, ac-
 quiring firms may replace inefficient managers, thereby improving the value
 of target firms' outputs following acquisitions. However, the results reported
 herein suggest that acquiring firms' managers should be prepared to accept
 what may prove to be significant trade-offs, including the substitution of
 investments in acquisitions for investments in discretionary activities like
 R&D. These trade-offs are important for all firms; however, they may be
 critical for firms in industries in which innovation is important. Thus, ex-
 ecutives can make informed judgments only when they recognize and care-
 fully analyze potential trade-offs. Acquisitions may produce efficiencies but
 may also increase managerial risk aversion. As previous research has indi-
 cated (Hitt & Hoskisson, 1991), over time such risk aversion may affect the
 strategic competitiveness of a firm.
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